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Abstract
We study pay-for-delay settlements between a patent holder and a challenger when
the patent holder can introduce follow-on products. We show that ignoring follow-on
products biases the inferred competitive harm of pay-for-delay settlements (the “Ac-
tavis inference”). The reason is that patent invalidation triggers an earlier introduction
of follow-on products, which changes pay-for-delay negotiation’s payoffs relative to the
case of no follow-on products. When follow-on products are ignored, we show that an
inference based on a reverse payment over-estimates patent strength. If parties cannot
use payments (as in pure-delay settlements), follow-on products may push the parties
to settle on an earlier entry date relative to the entry date that is negotiated in the
absence of follow-on products, and litigation may arise in equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
The patent system is founded on the premise that granting an exclusion right to an inventor
for a limited period encourages innovation. The right to exclude rivals creates market power,
so patents trade-off consumer-welfare losses and innovation incentives. In practice, whether
a patent holder can implement an exclusion right is uncertain (Lemley and Shapiro, 2005).
In the pharmaceutical industry, a generic firm can enter a market that is protected by a
patent after demonstrating: (a) the bio-equivalence of its product and a patented product;
and (b) that either the generic product does not infringe on the original patent or that the
original patent is invalid.1 In response to an entry attempt by a generic firm, the patent
holder (the brand firm) typically files a lawsuit that claims patent infringement. These
lawsuits have often been resolved through “pay-for-delay” settlements, where the brand firm
and the generic agree on an entry date for the generic (before the expiration of the patent)
and the brand firm makes a payment to the generic: a “reverse payment.”2
Pay-for-delay settlements have been one of the important categories of the intellectual prop-
erty and antitrust debate. The anti-competitive aspect of these settlements is that they
forestall competition by preserving patents that are unlikely to withstand reexamination
(weak patents). Given that competition between two substitute products lowers total indus-
try profit relative to monopoly profits, a brand firm and a generic entrant have incentives to
preserve monopoly profits and share the rents.3
This is particularly worrisome when the brand firm holds a weak patent, because pay-for-
delay settlement in this case can generate large consumer-surplus losses. Ghili and Schmitt
(2017) compare the consumer surplus that was generated by the pay-for-delay settlement
for the drug Lamictal with the consumer surplus that was generated in two counterfactual
scenarios: a settlement without direct payment (a pure-delay settlement); and litigation
to final judgment. They find that a pure-delay settlement would have increased consumer
surplus by $100 million, whereas litigation to final judgment would have increased consumer
surplus by $1.3 billion.
1This is part of the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984. For more details, see, e.g., Bulow (2004).
2The first generic to file a petition to enter the market obtains six months of generic exclusivity, which
facilitates pay-for-delay settlements (see Hemphill (2006) and Hemphill and Lemley (2011)).
3Jacobo-Rubio et al. (2020) estimate that brand firms value deterrence at $4.6 billion on average, while
generic entrants value the right to enter, on average, at $236.8 million.
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The FTC has challenged settlements involving reverse payments under the suspicion of anti-
competitive conduct (Hemphill, 2006). In FTC v. Actavis, 570 U.S. 136 (2013), the Supreme
Court concluded that reverse payments are illegal if they are used to avoid competition, but
they are not per-se illegal. The Supreme Court called on U.S. courts to apply the rule of
reason when dealing with pay-for-delay cases. Edlin et al. (2015) interpreted this ruling by
proposing the Actavis Inference: a settlement that involves a large and otherwise unexplained
payment, combined with delayed entry, supports a reasonable inference of harm to consumers
from lessened competition.
Pay-for-delay settlements have been studied in a setting with a single product. Our con-
tribution is to study pay-for-delay settlements in a setting with more than one product.
Specifically, in our setting the brand firm can introduce a new product that can be a radical
innovation or just a minor modification of an existing product. This is an important feature
of the pharmaceutical industry, where brand firms routinely introduce follow-on products:
This strategy has been called “product hopping” or “evergreening” when the follow-on prod-
uct is a minor modification: e.g., a reformulation from a capsule to a tablet.
Product hopping has recently attracted the attention of antitrust authorities. Cases that
involve product hopping include: AstraZeneca’s reformulation of Prilosec into Nexium (two
drugs that are used to treat severe stomach acid-related conditions);4 Abbott’s reformu-
lation of TriCor (a drug that is used to treat high triglyceride levels) from capsules to
tablets;5 Reckitt’s switch of its branded formulation Suboxone (a drug that treats opioid
addiction) from a sublingual tablet to a sublingual film;6 Warner Chilcott’s switch of Doryx
(an acne medication) from tablets to capsules;7 and Actavis and Forest Laboratories’ switch
of Nameda (an Alzheimer’s drug) from an immediate release formulation to an extended
release formulation.8
The main economic force in our analysis is the strategic use of follow-on products to moderate
the losses from patent invalidation. If the patent for the first product is invalidated, the
patent holder introduces the second product earlier. This strategic effect changes the payoffs
in a pay-for-delay negotiation relative to the case of no follow-on products. Consider a
simplified version of our model to illustrate this economic trade-off: First, suppose that
4For more details, see, e.g., Feldman and Frondorf (2016).
5Abbott Laboratories v. Teva Pharmaceuticals, 432 F. Supp. 2d 408 (D. Del. 2006).
6In Re: Suboxone Antitrust Litigation (201., 64 F. Supp. 3d 665, 681-83 (E.D. Pa. 2014)
7Mylan Pharmaceuticals v. Warner Chilcott, No. 12-3824 (E.D. Pa. June 13, 2013).
8New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC (Namenda), 787 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 2015)
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there is only one product. Under patent protection the brand firm gets a profit π for one
period. In this case, the patent holder risks π by going to litigation: The patent holder loses
π if the patent is invalidated.
Next, consider a setting where there is a second product that is protected by an ironclad
patent that generates a profit of πH for the patent holder. We assume that the second product
completely cannibalizes the sales of the first product, and that the patent holder prefers to
introduce the two products sequentially rather than simultaneously: πH < π + βπH , where
β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. In this case, if the first product’s patent is invalidated, the
patent holder loses a profit of π from the first product and introduces the second product
earlier, which creates a gain of (1−β)πH . Thus, patent invalidation changes the incumbent’s
profits by −π + (1− β)πH when there is a follow-on product; without a follow-on product,
patent invalidation changes the incumbent’s profits by −π.
The key insight is that the invalidation of the first patent removes the cannibalization between
the first and the second product, which triggers an earlier introduction of the follow-on
product. This effect implies that the invalidation of the first patent reduces the patent
holder’s payoff by less when there are follow-on products, which changes the patent holder’s
negotiation incentives.
We study settlements that delay entry both when reverse payments are allowed and when
they are not. First, when reverse payments are allowed, we show that settlements in the
presence of a follow-on product involve a smaller transfer from the brand firm to the generic
relative to the transfer in a model without follow-on products. Thus, an antitrust inference
that is based on this payment—such as the Actavis inference—over-estimates the strength
of the patent if follow-on products are not accounted for properly.
Second, in pure-delay settlements, we show that follow-on products could push the parties
to settle on an earlier date of entry relative to the equilibrium settlement date in a setting
without follow-on products. Thus, an inference that is based on the length of the delay
of entry that ignores follow-on products may under-estimate the strength of the patent.
Importantly, if the introduction of a follow-on product increases the brand firm’s outside
option significantly more than its settlement profits, this result reverses, and an inference
that is based on the length of the delay leads to an over-estimation of the patent strength. As
a consequence, welfare-loss estimates that are based on a settlement framework that ignores
the endogenous introduction of a new product may lead to biased results.
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Finally, we show that under pure-delay settlement, litigation may arise in equilibrium. In this
case a weak patent for the first product or longer development time for a follow-on product
both make settlement agreement more likely. The model provides a novel explanation for
equilibrium litigation even when firms hold symmetric beliefs about their litigation prospects.
Related Literature. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to provide a formal
analysis of pay-for-delay settlements with follow-on products. Carrier (2010) was among the
first to discuss pay-for-delay in conjunction with product hopping. Carrier (2011) presents
the case study of Provigil, which shows the anticompetitive harm that can result from the
combination of pay-for-delay and product hopping. Gallasch (2016) argues that product
hopping is facilitated by pay-for-delay settlements.
Feldman and Frondorf (2016) describe three “generations” of pay-for-delay strategies: In
Generation 1.0, brand firms pay cash directly to generics to delay their entry. In Generation
2.0, the brand firm uses side deals, instead of cash, to disguise the payment to generics. In
Generation 3.0, brand firms exploit regulation in combination with pay-for-delay to prevent
generics from entering the market.
Similarly, Kesselheim and Darrow (2015) discuss current and emerging challenges with the
Hatch-Waxman Act, whereas Hovenkamp and Lemus (2018) discuss how the Patent Trial
and Appeal Board (PTAB), a new venue within the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to
challenge the validity of a patent, has influenced firms’ settlement decisions. Dickey et al.
(2009) show that some of the conclusions in the analysis of pay-for-delay settlements change
after including real-world complexities such as litigation costs, risk aversion, asymmetric
information, time discounting, and cash constraints. Our model incorporates several of
these features (e.g., litigation costs and time discounting) in addition to follow-on products.
2 Pay-for-Delay and Sequential Products
There are two firms—B and G—that compete in a continuous time model. From time 0 firm
B, the brand firm, sells product O that is protected by a patent of strength θ ∈ [0, 1] and
statutory length T > 0. The patent strength corresponds to the probability that the patent
will be found valid and/or infringed in court. We assume that θ is common knowledge for
both firms.
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Firm G manufactures a generic version of product O. At time 0, firm G attempts to enter
the market by claiming that the patent that protects O is either invalid or non-infringed.
This leads to litigation: If firm G wins the lawsuit, then firms G and B earn flow duopoly
profits πd for a period ∆. After this period, free-entry drives profits to zero. If firm G loses
the lawsuit, product O is sold exclusively by firm B until T , because no other generic firm
will challenge the validity of the patent, and firm B receives monopoly profits πm.9 After
product O’s patent expires at time T , firms B and G make zero profit from selling product
O and its generic version, respectively.
Besides selling product O, firm B can introduce a follow-on product. By paying a cost K,
firm B is able to introduce product H at any time after time τ , where ∆ < τ < T − ∆.10
The parameter τ measures the complexity of developing product H: the smaller is τ , the
sooner firm B can introduce the new product. We assume that product H fully cannibalizes
the sales of product O or any of its generic versions. This assumption reflects either that
product H is superior to product O, or that product H is a minor modification of O but
the brand firm invests in marketing effectively to switch the market from O to H (product
hopping). We assume that product H is protected by an ironclad patent, which implies that
firm B obtains a flow profit of πH and firm G receives zero profit after the introduction of
product H.
At time 0, after the outcome of the lawsuit—i.e., after the court determines the validity of
product O’s patent, or after the firms reach a settlement—firm B decides whether or not,
and when, to introduce the new product. The decision of when to introduce this new version
of the product is contingent on the litigation outcome. We assume that firms discount time








which represents the discount rate between T1 and T2. A useful property of this discount
rate is δ(T1, T2) = δ(0, T2)− δ(0, T1) = e−rsδ(T1− s, T2− s), for any s ∈ [T1, T2]. We assume
that firms are sequentially rational and that there is perfect information, so the equilibrium
concept that we use is subgame perfect equilibrium.
9This assumption is explained by the privilege enjoyed by the first generic challenger as part of the Hatch-
Waxman legislation: It is the only generic firm to gain 180-days of exclusivity. Thus, no other generic firm
has an incentive to challenge the patent, because in the best-case scenario the patent is invalidated, but then
free-entry drives profits to zero.
10The assumption on τ is made for the sake of exposition.
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Incentives to introduce the new product
We assume that introducing product H at time T is profitable. This allows us to focus on
the effect of pay-for-delay on the timing of new product introduction rather on the effect
of enabling new products. The introduction of product H is profitable under the following
assumption.
Assumption 1 (Introducing H at T is profitable). K < πHδ(T, 2T ).
In principle, πH may be larger or smaller than πm. If πH > πm, firm B may have an incentive
to introduce product H before T to replace the lower flow profit that is generated by product
O. For simplicity, we study the case where firm B experiences a “replacement effect,” so it
has incentives to delay the introduction of H if the patent of product O is valid. For this to
hold, we impose that when firm B’s patent for product O prevails in court, then this firm
introduces product H at time T rather than at time t < T :
δ(0, τ)πm + δ(τ, T + τ)πH ≤ δ(0, T )πm + δ(T, 2T )πH ⇔ πH(1− e−rT ) ≤ πm (1)
Assumption 2 (Deferred Product Introduction). πH(1− e−rT ) < πm.
Under Assumption 2, firm B delays the introduction of product H until the patent of the
first product expires. Note that Assumption 2 holds when πH ≤ πm or when πH > πm
and r is sufficiently low (firms are sufficiently patient). If the patent of the first product is
invalidated by the court, or if there is a settlement agreement that delays the entry of firm G,
the timing of the introduction of the new product may change: The timing of product H’s
introduction depends on the litigation/settlement outcome. If firm B prevails in litigation,
then product H will be introduced at time T , right after the patent of product O expires
(Assumption 2). If the patent of product O is invalidated, then firm B has incentives to
anticipate the entry of H, because receiving πH early is better than nothing after time ∆,
given that δ(T, 2T ) < δ(τ, T + τ). Thus, firm B has incentives to introduce product H as
soon as possible—at time τ—after the patent for O has been invalidated.
Litigation Payoffs
An invalidation of product O’s patent triggers firm B to introduce product H at time τ
rather than at time T . With this difference in the timing of product H’s introduction, the
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litigation payoff of firm G and firm B are, respectively,
LG = (1− θ)δ(0,∆)πd − cG, (2)
LB = θ[δ(0, T )πm + δ(T, 2T )πH ]+ (3)
+ (1− θ)[δ(0,∆)πd + δ(τ, T + τ)πH ]− cB −K.
The parameters cG and cB correspond to the litigation expenses for firms G and B, respec-
tively. We denote by L̄B and L̄G the payoff of firm B and firm G, respectively, in the absence
of product H:
L̄B = θδ(0, T )πm + (1− θ)δ(0,∆)πd − cB. (4)
L̄G = LG. (5)
Note that firm G’s litigation payoff is not altered by product H. The reason is that by
assumption ∆ < τ : the entry of generic manufacturers occurs before the introduction of
product H. However, firm B’s litigation payoff increases with follow-on products, because
the invalidation of product O’s patent triggers an earlier introduction of product H. We
have the following result:
Lemma 1. A follow-on product increases firm B’s litigation payoff:
LB ≥ L̄B.
Proof. Firm B’s litigation payoff in a setting without new products equals L̄B. Notice that
LB = L̄B + πH [θδ(T, 2T ) + (1− θ)δ(τ, T + τ)]−K.
Given that δ(τ, T + τ) ≥ δ(T, 2T ), and by Assumption 1, we have LB > L̄B.
Firm G has a credible litigation threat if and only if LG ≥ 0: If cG ≤ (1 − θ)δ(0,∆)πd.
Otherwise, if LG < 0, the game ends.11 The generic incentive to initiate litigation is greater
when the patent protection product O is weaker—smaller θ—and it is unaffected by the
existence of product H.
11Throughout the paper, unless otherwise noted, we focus on credible litigation threats by the generic.
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The firms’ joint litigation payoff L = LB + LG is given by
L = θ[δ(0, T )πm + δ(T, 2T )πH ] + (1− θ)[δ(0,∆)2πd + δ(τ, T + τ)πH ]−
−cB − cG −K
= θδ(0, T )πm + (1− θ)δ(0,∆)2πd − cB − cG︸ ︷︷ ︸
Myopic P4D
+
+πH [θδ(T, 2T ) + (1− θ)δ(τ, T + τ)]−K︸ ︷︷ ︸
New Product
We can decompose the joint litigation payoff into two terms: a myopic pay-for-delay term
(Myopic P4D), which is the standard term when we do not consider follow-on products, and
a novel term that arises because of the introduction of a new product (New Product).
Patent invalidation through litigation distorts firms’ joint surplus for two reasons: (1) It
erodes monopoly profits during [0, T ]; and (2) it forces firm B to introduce product H earlier
than it would otherwise do.
Settlement
Under Assumption 2, firms maximize their joint settlement surplus by delaying the entry
of the new product until time T , to avoid the replacement effect. In this case, the firms’
best agreement is to delay firm G’s entry until T , which effectively prevents the entry of any
generic version, since the introduction of H completely cannibalizes the sales of product O
or any of its generics. Thus, settlement payoffs are
SG = x, (6)
SB = δ(0, T )πm + δ(T, 2T )πH − x−K, (7)
where x ≥ 0 is a transfer paid by firm B to firm G. The joint settlement payoff is
S = δ(0, T )πm + δ(T, 2T )πH −K.
The term δ(0, T )πm corresponds to the value of preserving monopoly profits until T , which is
the standard term in pay-for-delay. The term δ(T, 2T )πH−K (which is positive by Assump-
tion 1) corresponds to a novel term that arises because of the new product introduction.
Incentive to Settle
We define the incentive to settle (the bargaining surplus) as the difference between the joint
payoff from a settlement (according to a full delay) and the joint litigation payoff. We can
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write the incentive to settle as
I = (1− θ)[δ(0, T )πm − δ(0,∆)2πd] + cB + cG︸ ︷︷ ︸
Myopic P4D (IP 4D)
+ (8)
+ πH(1− θ)[δ(T, 2T )− δ(τ, T + τ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
New Product (IN )
.
It can be shown that under Assumption 2 we have I ≥ 0, so the firms always settle. In
Equation 8, we decompose the incentive to settle into two terms: IP4D is the incentive to
settle in the standard pay-for delay framework; and IN is due to the introduction of the
follow-on innovation. This term is negative and can be written as
IN = πH(1− θ)[δ(T, 2T )− δ(τ, T + τ)] = −πH(1− θ)rδ(0, T )δ(τ, T ) < 0.
It is easy to see that this term is more negative for smaller values of θ (weaker patents) and
for lower values of τ (faster introduction of the new product).
2.1 Pay-for-Delay settlement transfers with follow-on products
A follow-on product reduces the bargaining surplus relative to the standard case of pay-
for-delay: I = IP4D + IN < IP4D. The reason is that when the patent of product O
is invalidated firm B anticipates product H’s introduction. This anticipation increases the
litigation payoff of firm B, by reducing the replacement effect of introducing the new product
earlier (Assumption 2), which puts B in a stronger bargaining position relative to the case
of no follow-on product.
The implied Nash-bargaining transfer from firm B to firm G (the reverse payment) is
x = (1− θ)δ(0,∆)πd − cG + α(IP4D + IN), (9)
where α ∈ [0, 1] corresponds to firm G’s bargaining power. We can write this transfer
as x = xP4D + αIN < xP4D, where xP4D is the implied transfer in a pay-for-delay in a
framework that ignores follow-on products. Thus, if the anti-competitiveness of a pay-for-
delay settlement is evaluated by the size of the reverse payment, ignoring follow-on products
under-estimates the anticompetitive effect of the agreement: The implied patent strength
that is inferred from a reverse payment is biased upwards.
Proposition 1. If the size of a reverse payment is used to infer the quality of product O’s
patent, ignoring follow-on products leads to an over-estimation of this patent’s quality.
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Proof. Without a follow-on product (πH = 0) the inference of θ from Equation 9 is
x = (1− θ)[δ(0,∆)πd + αδ(0, T )πm − αδ(0,∆)2πd] + αcB − (1− α)cG.
Then,
θP4D = 1−
x+ (1− α)cG − αcB
δ(0,∆)πd + αδ(0, T )πm − αδ(0,∆)2πd .
When πH > 0, with a follow-on product, the inference of θ from Equation 9 is
θH = 1−
x+ (1− α)cG − αcB
δ(0,∆)πd + αδ(0, T )πm − αδ(0,∆)2πd − απHrδ(0, T )δ(τ, T ) < θP4D.
Proposition 1 shows that ignoring the follow-on product may lead one to believe that the
strength of the patent involved in the pay-for-delay settlement is higher than it actually is.
In other words, the Actavis inference is biased when we ignore follow-on products.
As an illustration of Proposition 1, we provide a numerical example with payoffs that are
similar in magnitude to those in Ghili and Schmitt (2017).
Example 1. Consider πm = πH = $2.23 billion per year, πd = $720 million per year
cB = cG = $50 million, α = 0.5, τ = 5 years, T = 20 years, ∆ = 6 months, and r = 0.03.
In this case, if we observe a transfer of x = $9 billion and we ignore the follow-on products,
we would then infer that θP4D = 0.47. However, if we consider that firm B can introduce
a follow-on product that generates a profit of πH = 2.23 billion per year, after observing a
transfer of x = $9 billion we would infer that θ = 0.27. The 20 percentage point difference
in the estimation of patent strength corresponds to an overestimation of 74 percent.
Figure 1 (left panel) shows the estimation of θ ignoring follow-on products (dashed line) and
incorporating them (solid line), for values of the settlement transfer x ranging between $3
billion and $12 billion.12 Figure 1 (right panel) shows the percentage point difference in the
inference of patent strength. The figure shows that ignoring follow-on products leads to an
over-estimation of patent quality, and this bias is higher when the reverse payment is higher.
12Ghili and Schmitt (2017) estimate a transfer between $8 and $12 billion.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the bias in the estimation of patent strength by ignoring follow-on
products. The dashed line in the left panel corresponds to the inference when follow-on products
are taken into account, whereas the solid line is the inference in a single-product setting.
2.2 Pure-delay settlements with follow-on products
What if reverse payments are forbidden? We study “pure-delay” deals, i.e., those in which
firm B allows firm G to enter at some time D ≤ T , as part of the settlement agreement. The
economic tension is the following: If product O’s patent is weak, a pure delay settlement
must allow firm G to enter relatively soon. But in that case, firm B will be tempted to
introduce the new product at τ rather than T , which potentially reduces the rents of firm
G. Therefore firm G would have to be compensated by entering even sooner.
If firm G enters at some time D ≤ τ , under the assumption that τ < T −∆, firm B prefers
to introduce the new product at τ rather than T if and only if
πdδ(τ, T ) + δ(T, 2T )πH < πHδ(τ, τ + T ). (10)
We assume that this condition always holds. Equivalently, this condition can be written as
Assumption 3 (Preemption). πd < πHrδ(0, T ).
Under Assumption 2 and Assumption 3, firm G will not accept any delay longer than τ .
Any delay longer than τ would result in zero profits for firm G.
We now consider the equilibrium delay in pure-delay settlements with a follow-on product.
Firm G’s payoff from accepting a delay of D ∈ [0, T ] to enter is
SG(D) =

δ(D, τ)πd if D ≤ τ,
0 D ≥ τ,
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while firm B’s payoff from that delay is
SB(D) =

δ(0, D)πm + πdδ(D, τ) + πHδ(τ, τ + T ) if D ≤ τ,
δ(0, τ)πm + πHδ(τ, τ + T ) if D > τ.
A delay D is feasible only if both firms unilaterally prefer that delay to litigation. Therefore,
the maximum acceptable delay for firm G must be larger than the minimum acceptable delay
for firm B. Any acceptable delay for firm G must be shorter than
DG ≡ max{D : SG(D) ≥ LG}.
Given that SG(D) is decreasing and continuous, when D ≤ τ , DG is the (unique) solution to
(1− θ)δ(0,∆)πd − cG = δ(DG, τ)πd. (11)
Similarly, the minimum acceptable delay for firm B, denoted by DB, satisfies
DB ≡ min{D : SB(D) ≥ LB}.
The firms’ settlement and litigation payoffs in a single-product setting—without product
H—are:
S̄B(D) = δ(0, D)πm + δ(D,T )πd,
S̄G(D) = δ(D,T )πd.
and D̄B and D̄G are defined, analogously to the case with follow-on products, by
D̄G ≡ max{D : S̄G(D) ≥ L̄G},
D̄B ≡ min{D : S̄B(D) ≥ L̄B}.
In Figure 2 we illustrate these thresholds for the parameter values in Example 1. Figure 2
(left panel) shows the maximum acceptable delay by the generic (solid line) and the minimum
acceptable delay by firm B (dashed line). The figure shows that D̄G > D̄B for any θ such
that the generic has a credible threat (LG ≥ 0). This implies that the firms always settle at
some delay in the interval [D̄B, D̄G].
In contrast Figure 2 (right panel) shows that this is no longer true with follow-on products:
For stronger patents (higher θ) the firms do not settlement because the minimum acceptable
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Patent Strength (3)



































Figure 2: Maximum acceptable delay for the generic (solid lines) and minimum acceptable delay
for the brand firm (dashed lines). The left panel shows the case of no follow-on products and the
right panel shows the case with follow on products.
delay by the patent holder is larger than the maximum acceptable delay for the generic.
Thus, with follow-on products, pure-delay settlements are more likely to occur when the
underlying patent is weak (low θ).
The next proposition characterizes whether firms settle or pursue litigation in equilibrium.
Proposition 2. When the patent holder can introduce a new product, a pure-delay settlement
can be reached in equilibrium if and only if






Otherwise the equilibrium features litigation on-path.
Proof. To have settlement in equilibrium, we must have that B’s payoff from a settlement
at G’s maximum acceptable delay must be larger than the outside option of litigation, i.e.
SB(DG) ≥ LB. Using Equation 11 and the definition of SB and LB we get
δ(0, DG)πm − cG ≥ θ[δ(0, T )πm + δ(T, 2T )πH − δ(τ, T + τ)πH ]− cB −K
Using that δ(0, DG) = δ(0, τ)− δ(DG, τ) = δ(0, τ)− (1− θ)δ(0,∆) + cGπd and that δ(DG, τ) =
δ(0, τ)− δ(0, DG), we get that settlement is incentive compatible if and only if the condition
in the proposition holds. Finally, since a pure-delay settlement is always incentive compatible
in the absence of follow-on products, it follows that litigation is less likely in that case.
Proposition 2 shows that litigation may be unavoidable as the result of follow-on products,
whereas in the single-product setting a settlement is always incentive compatible. Thus,
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follow-on products provide a novel rationale for why costly litigation might occur in equilib-
rium.13 Note that litigation arises in equilibrium for some values of θ when cB = cG = 0 and
K is not too large, because the left-hand side of inequality Proposition 2 goes to zero as θ
goes to one while the right-hand side of the inequality is strictly positive.
Figure 3 illustrates the settlement/litigation boundary—which is defined by imposing equal-
ity in the condition in Proposition 2—for different product introduction times (τ) and patent
strength (θ) and fixing other parameter values as in Example 1. First, for θ sufficiently low,
a settlement is always incentive compatible. For intermediate values of patent strength,
a smaller development time of the new product induces litigation in equilibrium. Finally,
notice that for θ ≥ 0.86 the generic does not have a credible litigation threat.
Patent Strength (3)






































Figure 3: The settlement/litigation boundary for different product introduction times (τ) and
patent strength (θ), for the same parameter values as in Example 1.
Corollary 1. Weaker patent strength facilitates settlements. An easy follow-on innovation—
a smaller τ—may prevent settlement and may facilitate litigation in equilibrium.
The corollary comes directly from comparative statics on the inequality in the condition in
Proposition 2. Interestingly, the more “difficult” it is for firm B to introduce a new product,
the more firm G is willing to tolerate a larger delay. Thus, a generic firm will not accept
long delay if it believes that τ is small. For instance, if product H is a minor modification
of the original product (product hopping), τ is presumably small.
13The literature has discussed other forces such as asymmetric information (Bebchuk, 1984), divergence
of beliefs (Priest and Klein, 1984), risk aversion (Heyes et al., 2004), or reputation (Che and Yi, 1993).
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For short development time (low τ), a generic will accept a delay only when the underlying
patent is weak (low θ). But if the original patent is strong and τ is small—as in the case of
product hopping—litigation ensues. Why did the generics in the cases discussed by Carrier
(2011) and Gallasch (2016) accept a delay? One plausible explanation is that the generic
firms did not anticipate the patent holder’s follow-on product.
Bargaining Solution for Pure Delay. Next, we focus on the case where settlement
is feasible—the condition in Proposition 2 holds—and we examine the outcome of Nash
bargaining over pure-delay settlements, which is the solution to the following problem:
max
D∈[DB ,DG]
[SB(D)− LB](1−α) · [SG(D)− LG]α. (12)




[S̄B(D)− L̄B](1−α) · [S̄G(D)− L̄G]α. (13)
It is easy to see that follow-on products decreases firm G’s settlement payoff for any given
delay D—SG(D) ≤ S̄G(D)—and that firm G’s outside option is unaffected: LG = L̄G. On
the other hand, it is clear that follow-on products increase firm B’s settlement payoff for
any given delay D—SB(D) ≥ S̄B(D)—and also that they increase firm B’s outside option:
LB ≥ L̄B (Lemma 1).
The net effect of follow-on products on B’s Nash settlement surplus with any delay D is
ambiguous: The effect depends on whether the increase in the settlement payoff or the
outside option is relatively larger.
The following proposition characterizes the Nash settlement outcome with and without
follow-on products:
Proposition 3. Follow-on products have an ambiguous effect on the equilibrium delay of
pure-delay settlement. If α is sufficiently small or if [θπHrδ(0, T ) − πd]δ(τ, T ) + K ≥ 0,
then follow-on products induce shorter equilibrium delays relative to the setting with a single
product.
Proof. An interior solution to Equation 12 is characterized by
(1− α)S ′B(D)[SG(D)− LG] + αS ′G(D)[SB(D)− LB] = 0. (14)
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Also, notice that S ′′B(D) = −re−rD(πm−πd) and S ′′G(D) = re−rDπd, so S ′′B(D) +S ′′G(D) < 0.










which is satisfied for interior values of D as long as α is sufficiently small.
Analogously, an interior solution to Equation 13 is characterized by
(1− α)S̄ ′B(D)[S̄G(D)− L̄G] + αS̄ ′G(D)[S̄B(D)− L̄B] = 0. (15)
Next, note that S ′B(D) > 0 and S̄ ′B(D) > 0, while S ′G(D) < 0 and S̄ ′G(D) < 0, and moreover
SG(D)− LG and S̄G(D)− L̄G are decreasing in D, while SB(D)− LB and S̄B(D)− L̄B are
increasing in D. Also, S ′B(D) = S̄ ′B(D) and S ′G(D) = S̄ ′G(D).
Furthermore, note that SG(D)− LG ≤ S̄G(D)− L̄G. We also have that
[SB(D)− LB]− [S̄B(D)− L̄B] =
= δ(τ, T )(πH − πd) + δ(T, τ + T )πH − πH [θδ(T, 2T ) + (1− θ)δ(τ, τ + T )] +K
= πH [δ(τ, τ + T )− θδ(T, 2T )− (1− θ)δ(τ, τ + T )]− πdδ(τ, T ) +K
= πHθ[δ(τ, τ + T )− δ(T, 2T )]− πdδ(τ, T ) +K
= [θπHrδ(0, T )− πd]δ(τ, T ) +K
By Assumption 3 this is always positive for θ sufficiently large. Moreover, since the πH term
is positive, a sufficient condition for the whole expression to be positive is thatK ≥ πdδ(τ, T ).
Thus if [θπHrδ(0, T )− πd]δ(τ, T ) +K ≥ 0, we have
SB(D)− LB ≥ S̄B(D)− L̄B, (16)
SG(D)− LG ≤ S̄G(D)− L̄G. (17)
For the optimal D̄∗ which solves Equation 15, we have
(1− α)S̄ ′B(D̄∗)[S̄G(D̄∗)− L̄G] + αS̄ ′G(D̄∗)[S̄B(D̄∗)− L̄B] = 0,
and since S ′B(D̄∗) = S̄ ′B(D̄∗), S ′G(D̄∗) = S̄ ′G(D̄∗), SB(D̄∗)−LB ≥ S̄B(D̄∗)− L̄B andSG(D̄∗)−
LG ≤ S̄G(D̄∗)− L̄G, the optimality condition implies:
(1− α)S ′B(D̄∗)[SG(D̄∗)− LG] + αS ′G(D̄∗)[SB(D̄∗)− LB] < 0.
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Note that the (1−α) term is positive, while the α term is negative. Next, since SG(D)−LG is
decreasing in D, and SB(D)−LB is increasing in D, the optimal D∗ which solves Equation 14
must decrease relative to D̄∗. Hence, under the condition [θπHrδ(0, T )−πd]δ(τ, T ) +K ≥ 0,
for any α, the pure-delay settlement with follow-on innovation features a shorter delay:
D∗ < D̄∗.
Finally, if α is sufficiently close to 0, the fact that SG(D)− LG ≤ S̄G(D)− L̄G implies that
the solution to Equation 14 involves shorter delay than the solution to Equation 15, i.e.
D̄∗ < D∗, with no additional conditions imposed the other parameters.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is that a follow-on product worsens firm G’s bargaining
position but it can either improve or worsen firm B’s bargaining position, because it improves
both firm B’s settlement and litigation payoffs. Delays are shorter when the improvement in
the settlement payoff dominates, and longer when the improvement in the litigation payoff
dominates, which may possibly even make settlement infeasible, if the improvement in B’s
litigation payoff is so large that settlement is no longer incentive compatible.
An especially clear case is when firm B has all of the bargaining power (α = 0) and makes
a take-it-or-leave-it offer to firm G. In this case, the best incentive-compatible offers that
firm B can make with and without follow-on products are given by SG(D∗) = LG and
S̄G(D̄∗) = L̄G = LG, respectively. Since S̄G(D) = SG(D) + δ(τ, T )πd ≥ 0, and SG(·) is
decreasing, it is clear that D̄∗ ≥ D∗: a follow-on product leads to a shorter delay.
Corollary 2. Follow-on products lead to shorter delays when firm B has all of the bargaining
power and makes a pure-delay take-it-or-leave-it offer to firm G.
Figure 4 shows firm B and firm G’s settlement and litigation payoffs with a follow-on product
(solid line) and without follow-on products (dashed line). The figure illustrates the ambigu-
ous effect of follow-on products on the equilibrium pure-delay settlements (when a settlement
is incentive compatible). Figure 4 (left panel) shows a case where product H increases firm
B’s settlement payoff (SB) relatively more than it increases firm B’s litigation payoff (LB).
This implies that the minimum acceptable delay by firm B decreases, so the equilibrium
delay is shorter. Figure 4 (right panel) shows the opposite case: LB increases relatively more
than SB, which potentially leads to an increase in the equilibrium delay for some values of
α. In each case, the relative bargaining power of the firms determine the equilibrium delay
D̄∗.
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Finally, we study how follow-on products affect a regulator’s inference about the strength of
firm B’s patent from an observed delay in a pure-delay settlement. Our analysis shows that
ignoring follow-on products leads to a biased inference: Conditional on any patent strength,
equilibrium delay is often (but not always) shorter.
Corollary 3. The value of patent strength that is inferred from a delay in a pure-delay
settlement can be over- or under-estimated when follow-on products are ignored. When α
is sufficiently small and [θπHrδ(0, T ) − πd]δ(τ, T ) + K ≥ 0, ignoring follow-on products
























Figure 4: Pure-delay settlement and litigation payoffs for two sets of parameters. Payoffs with a
follow-on product are represented by the solid lines, and payoffs without a follow-on product are
represented by the dashed lines.
3 Policy Implications and Discussion
The first policy implication of our analysis is that ignoring follow-on products in pay-for-
delay settlements biases antitrust inferences. First, when reverse payments are allowed,
the strength of a patent that is inferred from the size of the reverse payment (the Actavis
inference) will be over-estimated. Second, if reverse payments are forbidden and firms settle
according to a pure-delay settlement, the strength of a patent that is inferred from the
length of entry delay can be over- or under-estimated. When the brand firm has most of the
negotiation power, however, equilibrium delays will be shorter with follow-on products.
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When reverse payments are allowed, delay in generic entry is the same regardless of whether
follow-on products exist or not. The only effect of follow-on products in this case is on the
size of the reverse payment: The brand firm makes a smaller payment to the generic firm.
The delay in generic entry with follow-on products in the case of pure-delay settlements is
ambiguous: On the one hand, if a pure-delay settlement agreement is feasible, the presence of
follow-on products may result in an earlier introduction of the second product. This is good
for consumers, even if the new product is a minor modification (product hopping) rather
than a radical innovation, because that product would have been introduced later anyway.
But if pure-delay settlements are unfeasible and litigation ensues, then welfare may decrease
because settling litigation provides some private and social benefits: savings in litigation
costs, resolution of uncertainty, and the reduction of congestion in the court system.
We show that weaker patents (lower θ) make settlement agreements more likely, and also
that “quicker” development of follow-on products (lower τ) make settlement agreements less
likely.
In our setting we assume that the brand firm always finds it profitable to introduce a follow-
on product. This implies that a pay-for-delay settlement does not enable the patent holder
to introduce a new product, but instead it changes the timing of the introduction of this
new product. In a different setting, pay-for-delay settlements may change a brand firm’s
incentive to introduce a new product, and enable follow-on products. As Carrier (2011) and
Gallasch (2016) argue, this can be welfare reducing, if the follow-on product is a marginal
improvement of the original drug (product hopping) that would have not be introduced
otherwise.14
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